Evidences of ideation in monkeys 2.

Evidences of ideation in apes VII.

The light which I have obtained on the general problem of ideation has come, first, through a method which I have rather inaptly named the multiple-choice method, and second, and more incidentally, through a variety of supplementary methods which are described in Section IV of this report.

These supplementary methods are simple tests of ideation rather than systematic modes of research.

I hesitate to infer definite ideation from the available evidence, but I strongly suspect the presence of images and relatively ineffective or inadequate ideation.

I hesitate to infer definite ideation from the available evidence, but I strongly suspect the presence of images and relatively ineffective or inadequate ideation.

But their results are in many respects more interesting, if not also more important, in the light which they throw on ideation than are those previously presented.

Box and Pole Experiment Following the box stacking test, Julius was given an opportunity to exhibit ideation in another type of experiment.

I am not prepared to accept the solution of this problem as satisfactory evidence of ideation, but I do know that few observers could have watched the behavior of the orang utan without being convinced that he was acting ideationally.

Although throughout the report I have used freely the psychological terms idea and ideation, it has been my aim to describe the behavior of my animals rather than to interpret it or speculate concerning its accompaniments.

Extremely interesting and valuable definitions of ideation and discussions of the characteristics of different sorts of ideas in the light of original observations on monkeys have been presented by Thorndike (1901, pp. 1, 2; 1911, p. 174); Kinnaman (1902, p. 200); and Hobhouse (1915, p. 270).

Evidences of Ideation in Monkeys Aside from anecdotal and traveller's notes on the behavior of monkeys and apes we have only a scanty literature.

It appears, however, that Hobhouse's experiments were admirably planned to test the ideational capacity of his subjects, and one can not find a more stimulating discussion of ideation than that contained in his "Mind in Evolution."

Watson (1908) in tests of the imitative ability of P. rhesus saw relatively little evidence of other than extremely simple forms of ideation.

But in contrast with his results, those obtained by Haggerty (1909), in a much more extended investigation in which several species of monkey were used, obtained more numerous and convincing evidences of ideation in imitative behavior.

The work of Shepherd (1910) agrees closely, so far as evidences of ideation are concerned, with that of Thorndike.

His results, therefore, although extremely interesting and of obvious value to the comparative psychologist, throw no special light upon the problem of ideation.

As Hamilton's interest centered in behavior, he did not discuss ideation, but this does not prevent the comparison of his data with those of the present report, and the agreement of his findings with my own is obvious.

The Pithecus monkeys, which I studied intensively, yielded relatively abundant evidences of ideation, but with Thorndike I must agree that of "free ideas" there is scanty evidence; or rather, I should prefer to say, that although ideas seem to be in play frequently, they are rather concrete and definitely attached than "free."

Evidences of Ideation in Apes Reliable literature of any sort concerning the behavior and mental life of the anthropoid apes is difficult to find, and still more rare are reports concerning experimental studies of these animals.

Nevertheless, Hobhouse was able to obtain from him numerous and interesting responses to novel situations, some of which may be safely accepted as evidences of ideation of a fairly high order.

As no reference is made in Shepherd's paper to other descriptions of the behavior of these animals and as he adds nothing to what had already been presented, the reader obtains no additional light on ideation.

All are necessarily descriptions of the behavior of individuals who had been trained not for psychological purposes but for the vaudeville stage, and although such observations unquestionably have certain value for comparative psychology, it is well known that unless an observer knows the history of an act, he is not able to evaluate it in terms of intelligence and is especially prone to overestimate its value as evidence of ideation.

The various publications of Garner (1892, 1896, 1900) deal especially with the language habits of monkeys and apes, but observations bearing on ideation are reported.

For so far as one may say by comparing it with the curves for various learning processes exhibited by other mammals, it is indicative of ideation of a high order, and possibly of reasoning.