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5613 example sentences with  representation

5613 example sentences with representation

From a representation of the inarticulate sounds made by different kinds of animals uttering rapidly repeated cries.

Ireland is to have the extended franchise conferred by the Representation of the People Bill, but not the accompanying redistribution of seats.

Its parts are three,representation, collation, example.

A Representation is a statement demonstrating some resemblance of bodies or natures; Collation is a statement comparing one thing with another, because of their likeness to one another; Example is that which confirms or invalidates a case by some authority, or by what has happened to some man, or under some especial circumstances.

There is, I believe, but one representation in London of that celebrated prophet, and it is in the possession of his lineal descendant.

Truth to tell, she is tired to death of ittired of the room, the palette, the easel, the queen, the rhymer, the little dusky imp in the corner, whose wings are changing into scales and a tail, almost tired of dear Simon Perkins himself; who is working contentedly on (how can he?) as if life contained nothing more than effect and colouringas if the reality were not better than the representation after all.

The idea of substance becomes erroneous through the fact that we refer it not to the inner activity of representation, to which it rightly belongs, but to the external group of qualities, and make it a real, permanent substratum for the latter.

The essential difference between Rousseau's theory of the state and that of Locke and Montesquieu consists in his rejection of the division of powers and of representation by delegates, hence in its unlimited democratic character.

Metaphysics: the Monads, Representation, the Pre-established Harmony; the Laws of Thought and of the World.% Leibnitz develops his new concept of substance, the monad, in conjunction with, yet in opposition to, the Cartesian and the atomistic conceptions.

In discussing the representation in which the being and activity of the monads consist, we must not think directly of the conscious activity of the human soul.

Representation has in Leibnitz a wider meaning than that usually associated with the word.

The distinction, which has become of the first importance for psychology, between mere representation and conscious representation, or between perception and apperception, may be best explained by the example of the sound of the waves.

The distinction, which has become of the first importance for psychology, between mere representation and conscious representation, or between perception and apperception, may be best explained by the example of the sound of the waves.

These obscure states of unconscious representation, which are present in the mind of man along with states of clear consciousness, make up, in the lowest grade of existence, the whole life of the monad.

In conformity with this more inclusive meaning, perception is defined as the representation of the external in the internal, of multiplicity in unity (representatio multitudinis in unitate).

The objection has been made against Leibnitz, and not without reason, that strictly speaking there is no content for the representation of the monads, although he appears to offer them the richest of all contents, the whole world.

The objects of representation are merely representing subjects; the monad A represents the monads from B to Z, while these in turn do nothing more than represent one another.

So far then, as their action consists in representation, distinct representation evidently coincides with complete, unhindered activity, confused representation with arrested activity, or passivity.

So far then, as their action consists in representation, distinct representation evidently coincides with complete, unhindered activity, confused representation with arrested activity, or passivity.

So far then, as their action consists in representation, distinct representation evidently coincides with complete, unhindered activity, confused representation with arrested activity, or passivity.

The metaphysics of Leibnitz begins with the concept of representation and ends with the harmony of the universe.

The unity, as well as the difference, could not be greater than it is; every possible degree of distinctness of representation is present in each single monad, and yet there is a single harmonic accord in which the unnumbered tones unite.

As matter is merely something present in sensation or confused representation, so space and time are also nothing real, neither substances nor properties, but only ideal thingsthe former the order of coexistences, the latter the order of successions.

If thought ceased in deep sleep, we could have no ideas on awakening, since every representation proceeds from a preceding one, even though it be unconscious.

Consequently consciousness, will, understanding, and sensuous representation (imaginatio), together with corporeality, are our fundamental concepts.

That a representation or cognition is a priori does not mean that it precedes experience in time, but that (apart from the merely exciting, non-productive stimulation through impressions already mentioned) it is independent of all experience, that it is not derived or borrowed from experience.

[Footnote 1: The terms a priori representation and pure representation (concept, intuition) are equivalent; but in judgments, on the other hand, there is a distinction.

[Footnote 1: The terms a priori representation and pure representation (concept, intuition) are equivalent; but in judgments, on the other hand, there is a distinction.

For the coexistence or succession of phenomena, i.e., their existence at the same time or at different times (from which, as many believe, the representation of time is abstracted), itself presupposes timea coexistence or succession is possible only in time.

(2) Time is a necessary representation a priori.

But a representation which can be given only by a single object is a particular representation or an intuition.

But a representation which can be given only by a single object is a particular representation or an intuition.

Because, therefore, of the oneness of space and time, the representation of each is an intuition.

Consequently this original time must be unlimited or infinite, and the representation of it must be an intuition, not a concept.

Time contains in itself an endless number of representations (its parts, times), but this is never the case with a generic concept, which, indeed, is contained as a partial representation in an endless number of representations (those of the individuals having the same name), and, consequently, comprehends them all under itself, but which never contains them in itself.

The general concept horse is contained in each particular representation of a horse as a general characteristic, and that of justice in each representation of a definite just act; time, however, is not contained in the different times, but they are contained in it.

The general concept horse is contained in each particular representation of a horse as a general characteristic, and that of justice in each representation of a definite just act; time, however, is not contained in the different times, but they are contained in it.

It should be mentioned, further, that the conceptions of change and motion (change of place) are possible only through and in the representation of time.

The sensations of color, of tone, of temperature are, no doubt, like the representation of space in that they belong only to the subjective constitution of the sensibility, and can be attributed to objects only in relation to our senses.

That which according to Kant exists outside the representation of the individual is twofold: (1) the unknown things in themselves with their problematical characteristics, as the ground of phenomena; (2) the phenomena "themselves" with their knowable immanent laws, and their relations in space and time, as possible representations.

For these are predicates which must be attributed to the phenomenon itself as the object of my representation.

The process of stripping the leaves from the rose has actually taken place as a phenomenon and does not first become real by my subsequent representation of it or inference to it.

The phenomenon thus stands midway between its objective ground (the absolute thing in itself) and the subject, whose common product it is, as a relative thing in itself, as a reality which is independent of the contingent and changing representation of the individual, empirical subject, which is dependent for its form on the transcendental subject, and which is the only reality accessible to us, yet entirely valid for us.

Many places in Kant's works seem to argue against the intermediate position here ascribed to the world of phenomenaaccording to which it is less than things in themselves and more than subjective representationwhich, since they explain the phenomenon as a mere representation, leave room for only two factors (on the one hand, the thing in itself =

that in the thing which cannot be represented; on the other, the thing for me = my representation of the thing).

In the realm of things in themselves there is no motion whatever, but at most an intelligible correlate of this relation; in the world of phenomena, the world of physics, the earth moves around the sun; in the sphere of representation the sun moves around the earth.

If I wish to think the time from one noon to the next, I must (1) grasp (apprehend) the manifold representations (portions of time) in succession; (2) retain or renew (reproduce) in thought those which have preceded in passing to those which follow; (3) be conscious that that which is now thought is the same with that thought before, or know again (recognize) the reproduced representation as the one previously experienced.

If the mind did not exercise such synthetic activity the manifold of representation would not constitute a whole, would lack the unity which consciousness alone can impart to it.

The principle of the "Analogies" is, "All phenomena, as far as their existence is concerned, are subject a priori to rules, determining their mutual relation in time" (in the second edition this is stated as follows: "Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions").

We might now propose the following statement: The representation of the manifold of phenomena is always successive, I apprehend one part after another.

An extensive quantity is one in which the representation of the parts makes the representation of the whole possible, and so precedes it.

An extensive quantity is one in which the representation of the parts makes the representation of the whole possible, and so precedes it.

For all time determination presupposes something permanent in perception, and this permanent something cannot be in me (the mere representation of an external thing), but only actually existing things which I perceive without me.

The negative thing in itself cannot be known, indeed, but it can be thought; and the representation of it is a possible concept, one which is not self-contradictory (a principle which is of great importance for practical philosophy).

[Footnote 3: A category by itself, freed from all conditions of intuition (e.g., the representation of a substance which is thought without permanence in time, or of a cause which should not act in time), can yield no definite concept of an object.]

Matter is infinitely divisible, no doubt, yet it does not consist of infinitely numerous parts, and just as little of a definite number of simple parts, but the parts exist merely in the representation of them, in the division (decomposition), and this goes as far as possible experience extends.

The principle of complete determination, according to which of all the possible predicates of things, as compared with their opposites, one must belong to each thing, relates the thing to be determined to the sum of all possible predicates or the Idea of an ens realissimum, which, since it is the representation of a single being, may be called the Ideal of pure reason.

The definition runs: Will is the faculty of acting in accordance with the representation of laws.]

The difficulty can be removed only on the assumption of a common aesthetic sense, of a corresponding organization of the powers of representation in all men, which yields the common standard for the pleasurableness of the impression.

The beautiful is that which universally and necessarily arouses disinterested satisfaction by its mere form (purposiveness without the representation of a purpose).

Natural beauty is a beautiful thing; artificial beauty, a beautiful representation of a thing.

Genius is the faculty of aesthetic Ideas, but an aesthetic Idea is a representation of the imagination which animates the mind, which adds to a concept of the understanding much of ineffable thought, much that belongs to the concept but which cannot be comprehended in a definite concept.

For here it is the representation of the whole (the idea of the work desired) which as the ground precedes the existence and the form of the parts (of the machine).

We understand when the parts precede the whole (mechanically) or the representation of the whole precedes the parts (teleologically); but to think the whole itself (not the Idea thereof) as the ground of the parts, which is demanded by organic life, is impossible for us.

Hence the teleological view is a mere form of human representation, a subjective principle.

Karl Leonhard Reinhold (born at Vienna in 1758; fled from a college of the St. Barnabite order, 1783; in 1787-94 professor in Jena, and then as the successor of Tetens in Kiel, where he died in 1823) undertook the former task in his Attempt at a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Representation, 1789.

Kant's classical theory of the faculty of cognition requires for its foundation a theory of the faculty of representation, or an elementary philosophy, which shall take for its object the deduction of the several functions of reason (intuition, concept, Idea) from the original activity of representation.

Kant's classical theory of the faculty of cognition requires for its foundation a theory of the faculty of representation, or an elementary philosophy, which shall take for its object the deduction of the several functions of reason (intuition, concept, Idea) from the original activity of representation.

No one can dispute that every representation contains three things: the subject, the object, and, between the two, the activity of representation.

No one can dispute that every representation contains three things: the subject, the object, and, between the two, the activity of representation.

Accordingly the principle of consciousness runs: "The representation is distinguished in consciousness from the represented [object] and the representing [subject], and is referred to both."

From this first principle Reinhold endeavors to deduce the well-known principles of the material manifold given by the action of objects, and the forms of representation spontaneously produced by the subject, which combine this manifold into unity.

The thing in itself, which is to produce the material of representation by affecting the senses, is a self-contradictory idea.

The transcendental philosophy has never proved that the ground of the material of representation cannot, just as the form thereof, reside in the subject itself.

That alone is knowable which we ourselves produce, hence only the form of representation.

The matter of representation is "given," but this does not mean that it arises from the action of the thing in itself, but only that we do not know its origin.

In opposition to the usual opinion that a representation is true when it agrees with its object, he points to the impossibility of comparing the one with the other.

Of objects out of consciousness we can know nothing; after the removal of all that is subjective there is nothing positive left of the representation.

Thought can never be derived from being, because it is not contained therein; from being only being can proceed, and never representation.

(The representation of a triangle or a circle is a free one, it may be omitted; the representation of space in general is a necessary one, from which it is impossible for us to abstract.)

(The representation of a triangle or a circle is a free one, it may be omitted; the representation of space in general is a necessary one, from which it is impossible for us to abstract.)

It is only in the highest stage that consciousness or a representation of representation takes place.

It is only in the highest stage that consciousness or a representation of representation takes place.

The "deduction of representation" whose outline has just been given was the first example (often imitated in the school of Schelling and Hegel) of a constructive psychology, which, from the mission or the concept of the soulin this case from the nature of self-consciousnessdeduces the various psychical functions as a system of actions, each of which is in its place implied by the rest, as it in turn presupposes them.

%(d) The Practical Ego.%The deduction of representation has shown how (through what unconscious acts of the ego) the different stages of cognition, the three sensuous and the three intellectual functions of representation, come into being.

%(d) The Practical Ego.%The deduction of representation has shown how (through what unconscious acts of the ego) the different stages of cognition, the three sensuous and the three intellectual functions of representation, come into being.

If the ego did not limit its infinite activity neither representation nor an objective world would exist.

But why, then, are there such things as consciousness, representation, and a world?

The whole machinery of representation and the represented world exists only to furnish us the possibility of fulfilling our duty.

A gradation of practical functions corresponding to the series of theoretical activities leads from feeling and striving (longing and desire) through the system of impulses (the impulse to representation or reflection, to production, to satisfaction) up to moral will or the impulse to harmony with self, which stands opposed to the natural impulses as the categorical imperative.

I am fond of itnot so much on account of the representation, as of the opportunity which it affords for observing the dispositions of the people, and the bias intended to be given them.

Even the monastic habit was sacred from dramatic uses; so that a representation of cloisters, monks, and nuns, their costumes and manners, never fails to attract the multitude.

The Reader will see it is not foreign to my present Subject, and I dare say will think it a lively Representation of a Person lying under the Torments of such a kind of Tantalism, or Platonick Hell, as that which we have now under Consideration.

I do not know whether to call the following Letter a Satyr upon Coquets, or a Representation of their several fantastical Accomplishments, or what other Title to give it; but as it is I shall communicate it to the Publick.

In the same manner a Representation of those Calamities and Misfortunes which a weak Man suffers from wrong Measures, and ill-concerted Schemes of Life, is apt to make a deeper Impression upon our Minds, than the wisest Maxims and Instructions that can be given us, for avoiding the like Follies and Indiscretions on our own private Conduct.

'Spencer's general Plan is the Representation of six Virtues, Holiness, Temperance, Chastity, Friendship, Justice and Courtesy, in six Legends by six Persons.

The Design of Art is to assist Action as much as possible in the Representation of Nature; for the Appearance of Reality is that which moves us in all Representations, and these have always the greater Force, the nearer they approach to Nature, and the less they shew of Imitation.

'This Day is Publish'd 'A Representation of the Present State of Religion, with regard to the late Excessive growth of Infidelity, Heresy, and Prophaneness: Unanimously agreed upon by a Committee of both Houses of Convocation of the Province of Canterbury, and afterwards pass'd in the lower House, but rejected by the upper House.

At the same time will be Publish'd a Representation of the present State of Religion, &c., as drawn up by the Bishops, and sent down to the Lower House for their Approbation, Price 6d.'

The play was the 'School for Scandal,' I never liked it; indeed, I think it an indecent representation before ladies of character and virtue.