Neither was bound to active measures unless the other should be attacked by Russia, or any Power which had Russian support.

The persistent advance of Russia in Asia had in like manner been a source of growing apprehension to England since 1868; and, for a long time after the Treaty of Berlin, English statesmen were on the watch to check the growth of Russian influence in the Balkans.

This Russian alliance of France has been the only step in her continental policy which could be challenged as tending to overthrow the European balance.

Undoubtedly it is France's prime offence in German eyes; and her colonial policy has only been attacked as a pretext for picking a quarrel and forcing on a decisive trial of strength before the growth of Russian resources should have made her ally impregnable.

To the Austro-Hungarian Government the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day, July 24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was quite insufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the situation; and he urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the proofs of the charges against Servia.[30]

Russian Cabinet Council held.

Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to request extension of time-limit allowed to Servia.

Russian Foreign Minister warns German Ambassador that Russia cannot remain indifferent to the fate of Servia.

German Secretary of State refuses the proposal of a 'conference.' Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Russian mobilization in the four military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.

The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.' Sir Maurice does not actually endorse this opinion concerning the attitude of the German Government, but there can be no doubt that this general attitude was most pernicious to the cause of European peace, and that if the German Government had desired war they could scarcely have acted more efficiently towards that end.

It is interesting to note how this extremely serious warning was received by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg:'His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier ... that he received your communication without a comment.'

[Footnote 96: Russian Orange Book, No. 58 (infra Appendix VI).]

A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbors.

The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, in the afternoon of July 26th.

The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin in the evening.

Among it was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.

[Sidenote: see exhibit 17.] On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized.

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows: "The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia.

Count Szápáry was empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonow all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.

" Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in full swing.

The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization, menacing the security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the European cabinets.

The Russian mobilization in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.

The Russian mobilization in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.

The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us.